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INSIDER TRADING: WHY TO COMMIT THE
CRIME FROM A LEGAL AND
PSYCHOLOGICAL PESPECTIVE
Emily A. Malone*
INTRODUCTION
Insider trading,1 a crime that often involves the wealthy getting
wealthier, is a behavior associated with cheating and greed.2 It is
also a crime that is apparently difficult to deter.3 This phenomenon
can be illustrated by exploring current events. Insider trading hit
the newsstands again last year with the scandal involving the
ImClone Systems Inc. corporation (“ImClone”) and celebrity
businesswoman Martha Stewart.4 This note uses that example as an
* Brooklyn Law School, Class of 2004.
1
Although not defined in any statute or regulation, for the purpose of this
note insider trading is “the use of material, nonpublic information in trading the
shares of a company . . . .” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 798 (7th ed. 1999). For
the purpose of this note, only the distinct crime of inside trading will be
analyzed. Other forms of white collar crime will not be addressed.
2
See discussion infra Part II.B.1.b (discussing the connection between
insider trading and behavior associated with cheating and greed).
3
See discussion infra Part II (discussing why the normative and legal costs
associated with insider trading fail to effectively deter the crime).
4
See JAMES WILLIAM COLEMAN, THE CRIMINAL ELITE 89 (2d ed. 1989)
(listing prominent businessmen as defendants in the 1987 insider trading
scandal: “a partner in Goldman Sachs; the Director of Kidder, Peabody; the head
of risk arbitrage for Merrill Lynch; Vice Presidents from Paine Webber, E. F.
Hutton, Kidder, Peabody, and Shearson Lehman Brothers . . .”); see also
Holman W. Jenkins Jr., Business World: An Autumnal Resolution: Give Martha
a Break, WALL ST. J., Sept. 4, 2002, at A23 (putting the coverage of Martha
Stewart on par with impending war with Iraq). This scandal will be used in a
hypothetical context as an illustration of the theories explored by this note. See
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illustration of why people engage in the crime of insider trading
and why the behavior is not being effectively deterred.5
In Part I, this note examines how criminal causation theories
apply to insider trading. Since insider trading is a crime limited to
a particular kind of criminal, one who has achieved financial and
social success, the causation model of rational choice is applied.6
In Part II, this note, using the rational choice theory, weighs the
potential benefits of illegal trading with inside information against
potential costs from a psychological perspective. The potential
costs are normative, social, and legal. The cost of violating social
norms may be significant but, in the context of American culture,
the normative costs of trading with inside information are low.7 In
addition, the potential legal costs are examined and although found
to be significant, they are rendered ineffective by their inability to
adequately address the harms caused by insider trading and their
failure to consistently punish all types of insider trading.8 This note
suggests that people choose to engage in insider trading because
the incentives to trade with inside information outweigh the
deterrents.
Confounding the problem of ineffective costs is the possibility
of justification.9 A person that rationally chooses to commit the
crime of insider trading can justify his behavior in three ways:
also infra Part II.A (discussing the facts of the Martha Stewart scandal).
5
See The Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988,
Pub. L. No. 100-704, 102 Stat. 4677 (stating a maximum jail term of ten years).
Although Insider Trading may also incur civil and administrative liability, this
note will discuss only the criminal aspect of insider trading. See THOMAS LEE
HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION 658-60 (4th ed. 2002)
(discussing the various means of enforcement of securities laws).
6
See infra note 24 and accompanying text (applying rational choice
theory).
7
See discussion infra Part II.B.1 (comparing the norms espoused by
American culture and the traits that are associated with insider trading).
8
See discussion infra Part II.B.3 (discussing the failure of the law to
adequately address the harms of insider trading). The low legal costs fail to
stimulate higher conformity to the normative costs. Id.
9
Justification is used in this note to explain the internal process of
rationalizing a crime. See infra Part III. This has, however, no bearing on
justification as a legal defense.
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believing that insider trading is not actually illegal, believing that it
is not harming anyone, or simply refusing to accept responsibility
for the trade.10 The justification can resolve any conflicts the
person may feel about violating societal norms or breaking the law.
Therefore, Part II concludes that the decision to trade on inside
information is in fact a rational one. The potential benefits
outweigh the potential costs, and any conflict felt by the behavior
can be neutralized through justification. Finally, in Part III, this
note posits that the most plausible solution for deterrence of insider
trading is a clarification of the existing laws such that the legal cost
of the crime can compensate for low normative barriers.
I.

CRIMINAL CAUSATION IN THE CONTEXT OF INSIDER TRADING

Insider trading is committed by people who have achieved a
certain amount of success in society.11 This is a necessary
conclusion because by definition, an “inside” trader must have a
close enough connection to the financial world to receive access to
the information.12 This link is often through an elevated
employment position in a corporation, the position as a financial or
legal advisor, or through a social relationship with someone in an
inside position.13 This point is exemplified by the insider trading
scandals of the late 1980s involving prominent people and by the
current allegations against Martha Stewart.14 In light of the
10

See infra Part III (discussing how more effective legal costs could deter
insider trading).
11
ELIZABETH SZOCKYJ, THE LAW AND INSIDER TRADING: IN SEARCH OF A
LEVEL PLAYING FIELD 5 (1993) (defining the insider as someone who receives
inside information through their employment, relationship with the company, or
is tipped by others).
12
Id.
13
Id. at 116 (discussing the opportunity that executive officers, directors,
and majority shareholders have for trading on inside information and depicting
the stereotypical dissemination of inside information at the golf course). Printer
employees also have contact with inside information. See Chiarella v. United
States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980) (finding that printer who traded on inside
information had no duty to abstain from the trade); infra Part II.B.3.a
(discussing Chiarella).
14
See COLEMAN, supra note 4, at 89 (discussing previous scandals).
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conclusion that people committing the crime of insider trading
have already achieved relative success, it is important to look at
why they are willing to commit the crime and put their status and
wealth at risk.15
There are many competing theories on why people commit
crime.16 This note applies the rational choice model of criminal
causation.17 While many other theories may, in whole or in part,
explain the behavior of people who commit crime and disassociate
from society, these theories often fail to explain the behavior of
people who commit the specific act of insider trading but otherwise
conform to the law.18
It has been posited that certain people have an innate
criminality resulting from biological or physiological
characteristics.19 Similar to that theory is the claim that criminals
have a different psychological make-up and possess a sickness,
mental pathology or personality disorder that causes them to
repeatedly engage in crime rather than conform to the rules of
society.20 An innate physical, mental or psychological
characteristic may explain the actions of those who commit a
myriad of offenses or dishonest acts throughout their lifetimes, but
it does not explain those who conform to the law in general, but
trade on inside information because an opportunity presents

15

See supra note 4 and accompanying text (listing people who put their
wealth and status at risk by committing the crime of insider trading).
16
See, e.g., CLAYTON A. HARTJEN, CRIME AND CRIMINALIZATION 41-51
(1978) (discussing the different theories of criminal causation as physiological,
psychological, environmental factors or cost/benefit).
17
See infra note 24 (discussing rational choice theory).
18
See SZOCKYJ, supra note 11 (discussing the types of relationships
involved with being an insider).
19
Id. at 42-44 (discussing the theory that crime is caused by predisposed
biological factors). This theory has received recent support in the study of
repetitive antisocial behavior and is better suited to the study of crimes that are
the result of maladaptive behavior such as violent crimes. Diana H. Fishbein,
Biological Perspectives in Criminology, in THE CRIMINAL THEORY READER 9293 (Stuart Henry & Werner Einstadter eds., 1998).
20
See HARTJEN, supra note 16, at 58 (discussing the different theories of
criminal causation).
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itself.21 In fact, personality factors that have been associated with
people that commit insider trading hardly seem to be factors that
evidence a mental pathology or biological abnormality.22
Instead, personality factors associated with the crime of insider
trading often coincide with personality factors that are common to
people who achieve success.23 A study that examined the influence
of personality factors on ethical decision-making found a positive
correlation between insider trading and the factors of
competitiveness, youth and the male gender.24 Insider trading is a
crime of opportunity that, unlike other crimes of opportunity25 such
as stealing cars or embezzlement,26 does not bar the perpetrator
21

Although this note uses the ImClone Scandal to illustrate the rational
choice involved in the decision to commit the singular crime of insider trading,
it is necessary to acknowledge that Dr. Waksal, the CEO of ImClone, has
allegedly committed other infractions throughout his lifetime. See, Geeta Anand,
In Waksal’s Past: Repeated Ousters, WALL ST. J., Sept. 27, 2002, at A-1
(discussing Dr. Samuel Waksal’s repeated ousters from respected research
laboratories because of possibility of falsified results and dishonest work
suggesting a history of nonconformity). Perhaps Waksal’s behavior went
undeterred because his dishonest means to succeed did in fact conform to
societal norms. See discussion infra Part II B.1 (discussing the prevalence of
dishonesty and cheating in American society).
22
COLEMAN, supra note 4, at 201 (“It is generally agreed that personal
pathology plays no significant role in the genesis of white collar crime.”).
23
David E. Terpstra, et al., The Influence of Personality and Demographic
Variables on Ethical Decisions Related to Insider Trading, 127 J. PSYCHOL.
375, 385 (1993).
24
Id. It is also difficult to claim that people commit the act of insider
trading because they face outside factors such as poverty or other like hardships.
This would be unlikely because the ability to obtain inside information depends
on a certain amount of wealth and status.
25
Rational choice theory argues that criminals weigh the costs and benefits
of a crime when they are faced with situational factors that present an
opportunity to commit crime. See Derek B. Cornish & Ronald V. Clarke,
Understanding Crime Displacement: An Application of Rational Choice Theory,
in THE CRIMINOLOGY READER, 46 (Stuart Henry & Werner Einstadter eds.,
1998).
26
Embezzlement is distinguishable from insider trading because although
both occur in the corporate environment, embezzlement does not possess the
same legal gray areas as insider trading nor does it possess the social aspect of
insider trading in which tips are spread among family and friends.
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from participation in high society.27 Therefore, criminal law
theories that use biological, psychological or environmental factors
to understand the commission of crime are not useful to understand
insider trading. Instead, this note conducts a cost-benefit analysis
of insider trading.28
II. A COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS OF INSIDER TRADING
Insider trading, like other corporate crimes of opportunity, is
best analyzed through the framework of the classical school of
criminal law.29 The classical school views the human being as a
rational decision maker with a free will.30 This framework
discounts factors such as biological, psychological, or
environmental abnormalities, which are proposed by competing
criminal theories.31 Criminal conduct is viewed as a rational choice
derived through a cost-benefit analysis.32 According to the legal
theorist Jeremy Bentham, “[n]ature has placed mankind under the
governance of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure. It is for
them alone to point out what we ought to do, as well as to
determine what we shall do.”33 Put another way, crime is
committed when potential benefits outweigh potential costs.34
27

See SZOCKYJ, supra note 11, at 113-14 (discussing the social and
employment rewards that may stem from insider trading).
28
See supra note 25 (describing rational choice theory).
29
HARTJEN, supra note 16, at 54-55. The classical school employs a
rational choice theory. Like other crimes of opportunity, insider trading can be
explained by examining the hypothetical cost-benefit analysis a person would
engage in before committing the act.
30
Id. (noting that the classical school of thought developed from judicial
reform in the eighteenth century Europe).
31
See supra note 25 (discussing rational choice theory).
32
Id.
33
JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS
AND LEGISLATION (1789), reprinted in JOSEPH E. JACOBY, CLASSICS OF
CRIMINOLOGY 61 (1979). More primitively, this can be described as a balance
between pain and pleasure.
34
HARTJEN, supra note 16, at 42 (relating the degree of punishment to the
degree of deterrence). Modern criminal law recognizes rational choice theory
when it attempts to deter potential criminals through the high cost of
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The benefits of insider trading outweigh the costs for the group
of people that engage in the behavior. The cost-benefit analysis
utilized when deciding whether or not to commit a crime is similar
to that which is used in economic decisions.35 The nonexclusive
potential benefits associated with insider trading are increased
wealth, avoidance of loss, possible career growth, social status, and
maintenance of social relationships.36 The potential costs of insider
trading on inside information are violation of one’s own moral
beliefs, violation of social norms, violation of the law, and the
consequences that follow.37
A. Potential Benefits
The benefits of insider trading can be illustrated using the
ImClone scandal.38 A hypothetical analysis illustrates why the
members of the ImClone scandal may have committed insider
trading.39 The facts are alleged as follows: In December of 2001,
imprisonment. Id. This is not to say, however, that deterrence is the only reason
for imprisonment. Id. See also id. at 54-55 (stating that crime is the result of a
cost-benefit analysis).
35
See Lewis A. Kornhauser, Cost-Benefit Analysis: Legal, Economic and
Philosophical Perspectives On Justifying Cost-Benefit Analysis, 29 J. LEGAL
STUD. 1037, 1037-38 (2000) (discussing the similarity between economic and
legal cost-benefit analysis).
36
SZOCKYJ, supra note 11, at 113-14.
37
See Paul H. Robinson, Why Does the Criminal Law Care What the
Layperson Thinks Is Just? Coercive Versus Normative Crime Control, 86 VA. L.
REV. 1839, 1862 (2000) (explaining the normative cost associated with breaking
the law). See also The Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of
1988, Pub. L. No. 100-704, 102 Stat. 4677 (1988) (showing a possibility of
prison sentence for violating insider trading laws).
38
See Charles Gasparino & Jerry Markon, Merrill Aide Will Plead Guilty,
Cooperate on Martha Stewart, WALL ST. J., Sept. 26, 2002, at A1 (naming
players in scandal and their relative positions). See SZOCKYJ, supra note 11, at
116-22 (discussing common positions held by insider traders). The ImClone
scandal is a useful example because the alleged participants cover a broad range
of people likely to trade on inside information: a corporate officer, an
investment broker, friends, and family.
39
At this time only Dr. Samuel Waksal, former CEO of ImClone, has pled
guilty and been sentenced. See Jerry Markon & Geeta Anand, Waksal Pleads
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before the news was released that the FDA would not review
ImClone’s application for the new cancer drug Erbitux, former
ImClone CEO, Dr. Samuel J. Waksal attempted to sell some of his
shares in his corporation before the announcement caused a
subsequent fall in price.40 He tipped off family members and close
friends about the FDA’s decision not to review Erbitux.41 One of
those friends was Martha Stewart.42 Her Merrill Lynch broker,
Peter Bacanovic, subsequently sold Stewart’s shares of ImClone.43
The benefits each alleged inside trader would have gained if
successful were substantial. With the knowledge that the company
stock would plummet significantly when the news was released
about the FDA’s refusal to accept Erbitux,44 the traders would
avoid substantial pecuniary losses by trading before the
information was released and the market value of the stock was
drastically reduced.45 By avoiding the loss, the traders would not
endanger the social status they enjoyed as wealthy individuals.46
Peter Bacanovic could have enjoyed potential career advancement
associated with sharing inside information with an important client

Guilty as U.S. Widens Probe, WALL ST. J., Oct. 16, 2002, at C1, C15. All other
parties are merely alleged to have traded on inside information. Id.
40
See Geeta Anand, In Waksal’s Past: Repeated Ousters, WALL ST. J.,
Sept. 27, 2002, at A1; Charles Gasparino & Jerry Markon, Merrill Aide Will
Plead Guilty, Cooperate on Martha Stewart, WALL ST. J., Sept. 26, 2002, at A1;
Jerry Markon, Martha Stewart Could be Charged as ‘Tippee,’ WALL ST. J., Oct.
3, 2002, at A1 (detailing how Martha Stewart was linked to inside information).
41
See supra note 40 and accompanying text (discussing the facts of the
Martha Stewart scandal).
42
Id.
43
Id.
44
See Anand, supra note 21, at A10 (discussing the fact that Erbitux was
ImClone’s leading prospect and had been responsible for the company’s
previous success).
45
Id. at A1 (stating that as of September 26, 2002 ImClone’s stock fell to
less than nine dollars a share compared with more than seventy-five dollars a
share preceding the announcement regarding the rejection of Erbitux).
Hypothetically, if the traders had information that the stock would rebound at a
later date, they could then buy back their shares at a huge profit.
46
See SZOCKYJ, supra note 11 (discussing benefits associated with insider
trading).
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such as Martha Stewart. Dr. Waksal, by tipping off friends and
family, would have strengthened his social relationships with
them.47
B. Potential Costs
The most significant costs involved with committing the crime
of insider trading are the violation of one’s own moral beliefs,
social norms, and the law.48 To get a complete picture of the costs
a rational actor would face, it is helpful to evaluate the strength of
these informal and formal costs individually and then examine the
strengthening or weakening effect of the costs on each other.
1.

Violation of Moral Beliefs and Social Norms

Informal costs associated with committing a crime can be both
internal and external.49 Norms control people’s behavior internally
by affecting one’s view of oneself as a moral being and externally
by influencing the way others view their behavior.50 The cost of
violating a moral belief or social norm is perhaps even more
influential on behavior than the cost of breaking the law.51 The
internal cost associated with committing a crime is the violation of
one’s own moral beliefs.52 This violation reduces the ability to
view oneself as a moral being.53 Internal costs are closely related to
external costs because internal morals are often formed from
47

See Markon, supra note 38 (describing Waksal’s crimes). It is the author
of this note’s conclusion that Waksal received social reinforcement when tipping
his friends and family members. This conclusion is derived from the fact that
insider trading may serve as a form of social networking. See SZOCKYJ, supra
note 11, at 117 (illustrating how insider trading is often committed in a social
context).
48
See Robinson, supra note 37 (explaining the costs associated with
breaking the law).
49
Id. at 1861 (discussing types of informal costs).
50
Id.
51
Id.
52
Id. at 1862.
53
Id. (noting that people generally want to see themselves as moral beings).
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external sources.54 An example of this is a child that adopts his
parent’s view of right and wrong.55
An external cost of committing a crime is a violation of social
norms.56 Social norms define the line between socially acceptable
behavior and unacceptable behavior.57 They create an obligation to
act or not act in a particular way.58 Costs of violating a social norm
include a loss of decent public image, employment position and
social acceptance.59 Howard S. Becker, a distinguished sociologist,
posited that “[d]eviance is not a quality that lies in behavior itself,
but in the interaction between the person who commits an act and
those who respond to it.”60 In other words, it is society’s reaction
to behavior that acts as a deterrent. In terms of insider trading, it is
not the actual effect on the market that would deter a potential
inside trader, but the fact that he or she would be viewed as a
deviant by society.61
The costs associated with breaking an internal or external
norm, whether or not it is also a law, heavily influence an
individual’s decision to commit a crime.62 A useful explanation of
this influence is the “Esteem Theory” which states:
If many people agree that a behavior deserves disapproval,
if there is an inherent risk the behavior will be detected, and

54

See Robinson, supra note 37, at 1862 (stating that people come to hold
the moral standards with which they are raised as their own).
55
Id.
56
Id. (describing the power of social norms to deter crime).
57
RICHARD A. CLOWARD & LLOYD E. OHLIN, DELINQUENCY AND
OPPORTUNITY (1960), reprinted in JOSEPH E. JACOBY, CLASSICS OF
CRIMINOLOGY 171 (1979) (noting that norms define what is legitimate behavior
in society versus what is illegitimate).
58
Id.
59
Id. (discussing costs that occur even if not arrested for crime).
60
HOWARD S. BECKER, OUTSIDERS (1963), reprinted in JOSEPH E. JACOBY,
CLASSICS OF CRIMINOLOGY 196 (1979).
61
In applying the above hypothesis to the crime of insider trading the
assumption is made that societal norms provide deterrence rather than the
possible bad effects of the crime itself.
62
Robinson, supra note 37, at 1863 (discussing research that found internal
and societal control have stronger deterrent effect than legal sanctions).
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if this agreement and risk are well-known, then the pattern
of disapproval itself creates the cost to the behavior. When
sufficiently large, these costs produce a norm against the
behavior.63
People conform their behavior to receive positive esteem or avoid
a negative reaction.64 Therefore, in order to understand whether
insider trading is sufficiently deterred, it is helpful to ascertain
whether society disapproves of insider trading, and if so, whether
there is a well-known risk of detection.
a. Is Insider Trading Fair?
The harm most commonly associated with insider trading is
that it produces an unfair result.65 The claim that insider trading is
unfair derives from the belief that trading on inside information
destroys the integrity of the marketplace by giving an
informational advantage to a select group of insiders.66 This
informational advantage harms the outside uninformed investors
and causes instability in the marketplace.67 The idea that insider
trading is fundamentally unfair draws on the proposition that all
investors should have equal access to information and the benefits
of investing in securities.68 The trader using inside information
63

Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of
Norms, 96 MICH. L. REV. 338, 355 (1997) (discussing the effect that social
approval or disapproval has on behavior).
64
Id. at 356.
65
Ian B. Lee, Fairness and Insider Trading, 2002 COLUM. BUS. L. REV.
119, 120 (2002).
66
See HAZEN, supra note 5, at 640. Unlike other corporate crimes, such as
looting the assets of a company, insider trading, standing alone, affects stock
price by affecting the supply and demand of the shares rather than removing
value from the underlying company. See JONATHAN R. MACEY, INSIDER
TRADING: ECONOMICS, POLITICS, AND POLICY 25 (1991) (discussing the effect
on a company’s shares when a corporate insider trades on nonpublic adverse
information).
67
Bach Hang, The SEC’s Criminal Rulemaking in Rule 10B5-2:
Incarceration Should Be Made of Sterner Stuff, 41 WASHBURN L.J. 629, 633-34
(2002) (describing insider trading as “fundamentally unfair”).
68
MACEY, supra note 66, at 28.
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trades at the wrong price because the price of the security does not
yet reflect the inside information.69 Likewise, the uninformed
investor is unable to benefit from the nonpublic information.70
Thus, the uninformed investor is unable to trust the price of the
security as reflecting its true value and investor confidence will
suffer.71
There some lack of consensus as to whether trading with inside
information deserves disapproval, however.72 To counter the
argument that insider trading is unfair and harms outside
uninformed shareholders, there is an economic argument that
insider trading helps shareholders both by setting an advantageous
market price and by transmitting the information into the share
value.73 The argument claims that insiders benefit shareholders by
boosting share prices when they trade on information that a
company is going to have a future gain.74 This boost in price is
beneficial to outside uninformed shareholders whether they sell at
the time insiders are buying or if they hold onto their stock and sell
when the insiders sell.75 Likewise, a shareholder that buys shares
during the time that insiders are selling in advance of knowledge
that the company is going to have a future loss is benefited by the
decreased share price at the time of the buy.76 The buyer,
69

Hang, supra note 67, at 634.
Id.
71
Id. at 633.
72
Kimberly D. Krawiec, Fairness, Efficiency, and Insider Trading:
Deconstructing the Coin of the Realm in the Information Age, 95 NW. U. L. REV.
443, 444 (2001) (discussing the lack of consensus as to why insider trading is
wrong). See also Alan Strudler & Eric W. Orts, Moral Priniciple in the Law of
Insider Trading, 78 TEX. L. REV. 375, 375-76 (1999) (noting that answer to why
insider trading is wrongful is elusive). Compare MACEY, supra note 66, at 23-24
(citing Judge Easterbrook’s criticism of the fairness argument as without
explanation or content) and Hang, supra note 67, at 629, 633-34 (describing
insider trading as “fundamentally unfair”).
73
MACEY, supra note 66, at 24.
74
Id.
75
Id.
76
Id. at 25. The argument that the share price will fall as a result of insider
trading assumes that the insiders are selling a large enough quantity to flood the
market with shares and therefore lower the share price before the inside
70
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hypothetically, would have bought the stock regardless of the
insider activity and therefore reduces his loss when the stock falls
because the difference between the buy and sell price is reduced.77
The uninformed outside trader that does not react to the insider
activity and merely holds onto his shares is neither helped nor
harmed by the insider trading.78
There is also an argument that legalizing insider trading would
provide benefits for shareholders by lowering the cost of
management.79 Proponents of legalizing insider trading argue that
individual companies could decide whether to permit trading on
their own inside information and even offer it as part of a
compensation package to managers and directors.80 Allowing
managers and directors to trade on inside information involves no
more risk than allowing managers and directors to set their own
salaries and bonuses.81 In essence, this economic argument not
only rebuts the claims that trading on inside information is unfair
and harms the market, but actually proposes that insider trading
creates a more fair and accurate market by disseminating
information into the share price more quickly.82
The argument that insider trading can actually help the market
conflicts sharply with the idea that insider trading is so unfair that
information becomes public. If the quantity traded by insiders is not sufficient to
affect the price of the security then the uninformed investor will not be affected.
Id. (noting that it is the pressure put on the market by the insiders that would
affect the price).
77
Id.
78
Id.
79
MACEY, supra note 66, at 25.
80
Id. at 28-29 (arguing that including insider trading rights in a
compensation package would benefit shareholders by lowering managers’ and
directors’ demands for monetary compensation).
81
Id. at 30-31. This argument is premised on the argument that managers
sufficiently motivated by profits to harm shareholders through insider trading
would also be sufficiently motivated to harm shareholders through demands for
excessive compensation. Id.
82
Id. at 24-31. The argument, however, ignores other issues that may make
regulation of insider trading practical such as the difficulty of deregulated
monitoring, uneven compliance, and international pressure to regulate global
markets.
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it should be punishable by an extended prison sentence.83
Therefore, because there are such sharply opposed schools of
thought in the debate of how to treat insider trading, it is unclear
whether a person weighing the costs associated with insider trading
would perceive the crime to deserve disapproval from society.84
b. Is There a Different Set of Norms?
Furthermore, it is possible that the class of people likely to
commit insider trading subscribe to a different set of norms.85 The
potential benefits associated with insider trading signify that
behavior associated with insider trading may actually be viewed as
positive among the type of people likely to commit the crime.86
The example of a corporate director passing along insider stock
tips to his friends at a golf course illustrates the potential for
positive social reinforcement for the behavior.87 That director may
receive positive feedback such as elevated status, gratitude from
friends or the promise of future inside information from other
members of his group. A person in this social group is encouraged
to trade on inside information because of positive social
83

See Hang, supra note 67 (saying that insider trading is “fundamentally
unfair”).
84
For the purpose of this note, it is the perception of disapproval that is
important because it is this perception that will potentially deter the person from
trading with inside information. If that person is able to justify the act of insider
trading as fair or as failing to create a true harm, then the cost of violating social
norms will not be sufficiently high to deter the crime. See discussion infra Part
III (discussing the power of justification).
85
See SZOCKYJ, supra note 11 (discussing the likelihood that perpetrators
of insider trading have achieved significant social or monetary success). See also
Toni M. Massaro, Shame, Culture, and American Criminal Law, 89 MICH. L.
REV. 1880, 1933-34 (1991) (discussing the difference between middle class and
the wealthy in relation to public shame). Massaro found that the middle class is
much more responsive to the threat of public shame than the wealthy because
they need society’s approval to achieve success, whereas the wealthy are already
outliers of mainstream society. Id.
86
See supra Part II.A (discussing the benefits of insider trading).
87
See SZOCKYJ, supra note 11 (discussing the relationships involved in
insider trading).
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reinforcement, not dissuaded from the activity because of a fear
that society would view them as engaging in unfair behavior.88
An illustration of this type of reinforcement is the insider that
is immersed in the business world driven by financial gain. In a
study involving students in various business schools it was
determined that a person would be likely to commit corporate
crime if the crime was supported by their corporate environment.89
This propensity to commit crime was not explained by a feeling of
invulnerability to legal sanctions, but instead by a feeling that
behavior was deemed necessary or acceptable by their
workplace.90 The study found that people were especially likely to
commit crime for their workplace when the company was doing
poorly or faced with international competition.91 This may indicate
that people that trade with inside information may be influenced by
a different set of social values—the values of their particular social
group or corporate society. Similarly, an individual may also be
influenced by the ethics of his profession to commit acts that harm
the corporation.92 Corporate managers or directors may want to
match the monetary success of their contemporaries and may put
their own needs above their duty to the corporation in order to
achieve exorbitant ends.93
88

See, e.g., Raymond Paternoster & Sally Simpson, Sanction Threats and
Appeals to Morality: Testing a Rational Choice Model of Corporate Crime, 30
LAW & SOC’Y REV. 549, 573-74 (1996) (finding that employees are more likely
to commit crime when it is reinforced by their corporate society).
89
Id.
90
Id. at 574. This propensity to commit crime for the benefit of the
employer is illustrative of the more relaxed ethical standards of the business
world. Id. (providing examples of when the business world espouses more
relaxed ethics).
91
Id. at 568.
92
See Lisa G. Lerman, The Slippery Slope From Ambition to Greed to
Dishonesty: Lawyers, Money, and Professional Integrity, HOFSTRA L. REV. 879,
889 (2002) (detailing the decline in legal ethics in response to the increase in
legal earnings).
93
See Matt Murray, Rachel Emma Silverman, & Carol Hymowitz, GE’s
Jack Welch Meets His Match in Divorce Court, WALL ST. J, Nov. 27, 2002, at
A1 (noting that after divorce proceedings revealed exorbitant retirement perks,
Welch was forced to relinquish 2.5 million to the corporation). This example
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The low normative cost can also be understood when looking
at the positive and negative aspects of insider trading in the context
of American culture as a whole.94 Insider trading is often thought
of as cheating, unfair and greedy.95 Although none of the above
named traits sound especially moral or positive, American culture
does reinforce self-interested, competitive behavior and highly
values material gain.96 Especially in the business world, unfair and
greedy behavior is accepted as commonplace.97 Greed has been
considered so commonplace that “rather than be an aberration, this
attitude reflects business ethics and practices throughout North
American history.”98 Cheating, despite its negative connotations,
shows how a member of the business world may be influenced to act against the
interest of the corporation in contrast to the employee that commits crime for the
benefit of the corporation.
94
See infra notes 100-07 and accompanying text (discussing the values of a
capitalist society). It is worthwhile to note that other countries with market
economies also have insider trading, however, many of the other countries do
not condemn insider trading as much as the American legal system does, and
some of the countries did not start regulating insider trading until recently under
pressure from the United States.
95
See William R. McLucas et al., Common Sense, Flexibility, and
Enforcement of the Federal Securities Laws, 51 BUS. LAW. 1221, 1233 (1996)
(stating that “insider trading pure and simple, is cheating”); see also Peter M.
Donnelly, The Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988
and Controlling Person Liability: Can Firms Outside the Securities Industry
Risk Not to Adopt Insider Trading Safeguard?, 67 U. DET. L. REV 261, 265
(1990) (finding the unfairness argument to be based on the premise that insider
trading is cheating). See supra Part II.B.1.a (discussing insider trading as
fundamentally unfair). See SZOCKYJ, supra note 11, at 113 (noting the large
monetary gains that can result from trading with inside information). It is the
author of this note’s conclusion that insider trading is perceived as greedy.
96
COLEMAN, supra note 4, at 203 (“[T]he culture of industrial capitalism
tends to encourage values, attitudes, and personality structures conducive to
white collar crime.”). The culture of industrial capitalism encourages people to
strive for material success of the individual in a highly competitive atmosphere.
Id. In contrast to a culture that encourages success for the group or sharing of
wealth, industrial capitalism leads one to act for one’s own benefit potentially at
the expense of others. Id.
97
See Paternoster, supra note 88 (giving examples of when corporate
society encourages crime to get ahead).
98
THOMAS GABOR, EVERYBODY DOES! CRIME BY THE PUBLIC 116 (1994).
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may not be a significant enough deviation from normative
behavior to impose a high enough cost to outweigh the benefits of
insider trading.
Although insider trading is labeled unfair, unfairness is actually
a societal norm.99 A capitalist economy100 values self-interest over
public interest.101 Although considered to be immoral by some,102
promotion of self-interest is at the heart of the American economy
and culture.103 In American culture the individual is placed above
the group and must be both aggressive and competitive to
survive.104 Some people have unfair advantages over others
because American society reflects a huge disparity between the
wealthy and the poor.105 If one is born with material advantages,
one can receive a better education, often have better access to
employment opportunities, and exert more influence over social
99

Although the acceptance of this unfairness maybe grudging in some
cases, the author posits that unfairness is an inherent characteristic of a capitalist
society where all people are not economic equals.
100
Capitalism is defined as “[a]n economic system that depends on the
private ownership of the means of production and on competitive forces to
determine what is produced.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 202 (7th ed. 1999).
Therefore, by definition the American economy encourages a society in which
individuals compete against each other to increase production and material
success. See JOYCE KOLKO, AMERICA AND THE CRISIS OF WORLD CAPITALISM
XIV (1974) (labeling America as capitalist).
101
IAN TAYLOR, CRIME IN CONTEXT: A CRITICAL CRIMINOLOGY OF
SOCIETIES 64 (1999).
102
EMILE DURKHEIM, Attachment to Social Groups, in MORAL EDUCATION
(Everett K. Wilson & Herman Schnurer trans., The Free Press 1961), reprinted
in JOSEPH E. JACOBY, CLASSICS OF CRIMINOLOGY 183 (1979) (rejecting the
promotion of self-interest as moral).
103
GABOR, supra note 98, at 52 (discussing the pursuit of winning and selfinterest as central themes in history).
104
Id. at 222-23 (describing how American culture influences crime).
105
See Janet Stidman Eveleth, Growing Up in a Violent and Indifferent
World: Children Struggle to Survive, 36 JUN MD. B.J. 2, 5-6 (2003) (discussing
the polarization of American society and the growing disparity between the rich
and the poor). See also Amy L. Chua, The Paradox of Free Market Democracy:
Rethinking Development Policy, 41 HARV. INT’L. L.J. 287, 287-88 (2000)
(noting that a market economy produces enormous concentrations of wealth in
the hands of a few).
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and political policy.106
Although cheating has more negative connotations than
unfairness and is at times considered unacceptable business
practice, cheating does not have an extremely high moral cost.107
Cheating can be seen as immoral because it is profiting at the
expense of other’s moral behavior and gleaning an unfair
advantage.108 Achieving that unfair advantage in American society,
however, is not necessarily in violation of social norms.109
Whether or not cheating truly violates social norms varies along a
106

See LAWRENCE E. MITCHELL, CORPORATE IRRESPONSIBILITY 256-57
(2001) (looking at German and Japanese corporations and stating that “it is not
the case that all advanced industrial countries treat material wealth as the end, at
least anywhere near the degree that Americans do.”). Many countries have a
large disparity between the rich and the poor, though it is arguable that
American culture is distinguishable from other advanced industrialized countries
as more individualized and materialistically driven. See COLEMAN, supra note 4,
at 203 (discussing the values of a capitalist country). Although insider trading
occurs and is illegal in both Germany and Japan, and although insider trading
just became illegal in Germany in 1992, neither country punishes insider trading
with the level of seriousness that the United States does. See Victor F. Calaba,
The Insiders: A Look at the Comprehensive and Potentially Unnecessary
Regulatory Approaches to Insider Trading in Germany and the United States,
Including the SEC’s Newly Effective Rules 10b5-1 and 10B5-2, 23 LOY. L.A.
INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 457, 469 (2001) (discussing Germany’s recent
promulgation of insider trading regulations under pressure to compete with
foreign markets); Ramnzi Nasser, The Morality of Insider Trading in the United
States and Abroad, 52 OKLA. L.REV. 377, 381 (1999) (noting that Japan did not
enact criminal sanctions for insider trading until 1988 despite “rampant” insider
trading, and also noting that Japan had only sentenced one trader to jail at time
of article’s publication). It is unclear and a potential area for research to
determine if this lack of punishment means that insider trading is not as
disruptive on the Japanese and German markets because of a more responsible
corporate culture or whether it is just not perceived to be as great a wrong. See
Calaba, supra; Nasser, supra.
107
Stuart P. Green, Why It’s a Crime to Tear the Tag Off a Mattress:
Overcriminalization and Moral Content of Regulatory Offense, 46 EMORY L.J.
1533, 1552 (1997) (categorizing cheating as a prima facie immoral act). This
note will show that although cheating may be “a prima facie immoral act” it is
relatively acceptable in our society.
108
Id.
109
See supra Part II.B.1.b (discussing the norms in American culture).
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continuum of behavior. At one extreme, cheating in such a way
that produces a dangerous outcome must be considered wrong.110
At the other extreme, however, certain forms of cheating are
considered to be acceptable because the harm is not identifiable or
the harm is expected.111
At both extremes the person’s dishonesty is in fact cheating
another person out of value owed.112 Likewise insider trading
varies from a small dollar amount with little or no effect on the
market to a large trade that will drastically affect share prices.113
Many forms of cheating thus do not have a high normative cost.
Therefore, at least at the lower end of the continuum, insider
trading is not in clear violation of societal norms. Insider trading
can be considered a relatively morally neutral behavior.114
2.

Interaction between Societal Norms and the Law

The costs associated with moral belief and societal norms are
low. It is also probable that much insider trading goes undetected

110

See Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 174 Cal. Rptr. 348, 370 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1981) (finding that Ford did not include a bladder in the fuel system that
could have prevented harm at a cost of four to eight dollars per car to realize a
savings of 20.9 million dollars).
111
Examples of cheating that do not have a high normative cost could be
looking at the answers while completing a puzzle or taking extra “post it” notes
from the company supply closet. Cf. GABOR, supra note 98, at 57-60 (looking at
dishonest acts committed by law abiding citizens).
112
See supra notes 110-11 (giving examples of cheating behavior).
113
See discussion supra Part II.B.1 (noting the harms caused by insider
trading). See also SZOCKYJ, supra note 11, at 59 (quoting a SEC official stating
that only the larger trades get picked up by surveillance and that only a tiny
fraction of the smaller illicit trades are caught).
114
This note argues that although insider trading is considered cheating
behavior, cheating is in fact considered acceptable in many situations. Green,
supra note 107, at 1547 (quoting Peter Arenella in defining morally neutral
conduct as behavior that does not “violate any religious doctrine or communitybased moral norms”). This is a helpful definition of morally neutral behavior
although Green comes to the conclusion in his article that insider trading does in
fact violate the community based norm of cheating. Id.
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because of the secretive nature of the crime.115 The difficulty of
detection in combination with the fact that insider trading is an illdefined offense fail to provide the “well known risk” necessary to
generate the pattern of disapproval espoused by the “Esteem
Theory.”116 Therefore, it is likely that despite the great influence
societal norms have on human behavior, there is not a strong
normative cost to committing insider trading.
The amount of influence a norm has on the decision to commit
a crime can be strengthened or weakened by the law.117 Since this
analysis has concluded that there is not a sufficiently high
normative cost, an effective legal cost would be necessary to offset
the benefits of insider trading.118 The legal consequences for
115

SZOCKYJ, supra note 11, at 55 (insinuating that although the SEC has
publicly prosecuted a high profile case they have been unable to detect the
majority of insider trading). See id. at 59 (noting that SEC is unable to
proactively detect many of the illicit trades because they are too small to register
on the surveillance system). See also Stephen M. Bainbridge, Incorporating
State Law Fiduciary Duties into the Federal Insider Trading Prohibition, 52
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1189, 1262 (1995) (noting that it is difficult to detect
when insider trading is taking place, who is making the trades, and if detected it
is difficult to build a case against the trader); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Insider
Trading Under the Restatement of the Governing Lawyers, 19 J. CORP. L. 1, 29
(1993) (citing that it has been estimated that one in five cases of insider trading
is successfully prosecuted and that it is very difficult to tell when insider trading
is taking place). A contributing factor to the problem of detection may be the
SEC’s lack of funding. See Peter M.O. Wong, Insider Trading Regulation of
Law Firms: Expanding ITSFEA’S Policy and Procedures Requirement, 44
HASTINGS L.J. 1159, 1163 (1993) (citing the SEC’s lack of funding as
contributing to problems of detection). See also Molly Ivins, Mutual Funds
Managers Ambush the Middle Class, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 6, 2003, at 31 (saying that
the SEC is underfunded); Craig D. Rose, Only a Few Bad Apples? Despite
Reforms, Investors Haven’t Seen the Last of Corporate Greed, SAN DIEGO
UNION-TRIB., May 4, 2003, at H-1 (noting that the SEC is underfunded and
understaffed).
116
See supra note 63 and accompanying text (discussing the Esteem
Theory).
117
McAdams, supra note 63, at 347 (finding that “(1) sometimes norms
control individual behavior to the exclusion of the law, (2) sometimes norms and
law together influence behavior, and (3) sometimes norms and law influence
each other”).
118
Robert Cooter, Symposium: Normative Failure of Law, 82 CORNELL L.
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behavior increase the social view that the behavior is not
acceptable.119 Social norms can also strengthen or weaken
compliance with the law.120 If a law is passed expressing values
that the culture already espouses, then conformity to the law will
be strengthened. If the legal sanction does not coincide with
normative values and is not perceived as a sincere risk, however,
the legal sanction may not be perceived as a high enough cost and
will have little or no deterrent effect.121
In theory, criminal law can shape ambiguous social norms by
highlighting the “wrongfulness of the contemplated conduct,” but
insider trading has an ambiguous relationship to social norms.122
The behavior is a form of cheating because it uses an unfair
advantage at the expense of another.123 Also, the positive value of
the behavior benefits the individual rather than society.124
Although, as previously discussed, it may not be at odds with
American culture, insider trading could be susceptible to being
constrained by the law.125 Insider trading law, however, is both

REV. 947, 949 (1997) (discussing how the law may impose a beneficial social
norm). An example of a successful interaction between the law and social norms
is the laws prohibiting sexual harassment in the workplace. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2
(West 2003) (outlawing employment discrimination based on sex). Another
commonly discussed example is coinciding legal sanction and social stigma
associated with perpetrators of racial discrimination. Id. (outlawing employment
discrimination based on race). In the case of racial discrimination, both the law
and the society changed over time to outlaw discrimination based on race. Id.
119
See Cooter, supra note 118 (discussing how the law interacts with
societal view).
120
See McAdams, supra note 63 (discussing the relationship between
social norms and compliance with the law).
121
Robinson, supra note 37, at 1868 (noting the failure of Prohibition
laws).
122
Id. at 1864.
123
See supra note 95 and accompanying text (labeling insider trading as
cheating).
124
See discussion supra Part II.A (discussing the individual benefits
associated with insider trading).
125
See Cooter, supra note 118 (noting how the law may impose a
beneficial social norm).
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vague and contradictory.126 The law does not highlight the
wrongfulness of the behavior because the law does not consistently
punish those that produce an “unfair”127 result, nor does it punish
all of the people who knowingly use inside information to their
advantage.128 It fails to clearly define the offense or to provide
consistent deterrence for the behavior.129 Therefore, it fails to
strengthen the normative values or increase the cost of insider
trading.
3. Violation of the Law
Violating the law puts an individual at risk of being arrested,
prosecuted and convicted.130 Conviction includes the possibility of
monetary fines or loss of freedom.131 The crime of insider trading
carries significant civil and criminal penalties.132 These penalties
have increased overtime presumably with the hope that deterrence
would increase.133 The high costs of treble damages and the
possibility of five to ten years in prison should outweigh the
benefits to insider trading.134 In order to be effective, however,
legal costs associated with insider trading must be perceived as a
126

See infra Part II.B.3 (discussing ambiguity of insider trading law).
See Hang, supra note 67 (describing insider trading as unfair).
128
See infra note 150 and accompanying text (discussing the fact that
corporate insiders are permitted to profit from inside information by holding
onto their shares or tipping others to hold shares, rather than making their
regular trades, if they have knowledge that prices will increase).
129
See supra Part II.B.3.a-c (discussing how the law fails to provide a clear
message as to what constitutes insider trading and why some types of insider
trading are allowed despite producing the same harms as illegal insider trading).
130
KADISH, SANFORD H. & STEPHEN J.SCHULHOFER, CRIMINAL LAW AND
ITS PROCESSES 2-6 (7th ed. 2001) (discussing criminal justice system).
131
See The Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988,
Pub. L. No. 100-704, 102 Stat. 4677 (1988) (increasing maximum jail term to
ten years); The Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-376 98
Stat. 1264 (1984) (allowing the imposition of treble damages on anyone found
to have traded on material nonpublic information).
132
17 C.F.R. § 243.100-243.103 (2000).
133
See supra note 131 (noting the increased penalties).
134
See supra Part II.A (describing the benefits of insider trading).
127

MALONE1.DOC

3/3/2004 1:50 PM

INSIDER TRADING: A RATIONAL CHOICE

349

real risk and the act of insider trading must be perceived as a true
crime.
Unfortunately, the law fails to adequately support the legal
cost.135 Insider trading is an ambiguous offense that is difficult to
detect136 and is not actually defined in any legislation.137 The
Supreme Court’s interpretation of the legislation is often at odds
with the SEC and offers confusing results.138 Insider trading is
commonly described as a trade in which “a person, [in breach of
their duty,] in possession of material nonpublic information about a
company, trades in the company’s securities and makes a profit or
avoids a loss.”139 It is often unclear, however, who has a duty, why
some material nonpublic information is treated differently than
other material nonpublic information, and why only some people
who profit from inside information are punishable.140 Although all
trades using inside information would affect the marketplace and
the uninformed outside investor in the same way, not all trades
using inside information are considered illegal.141 This formulation
of insider trading does not adequately serve to prevent the harm
caused by insider trading.142 Thus, unpredictable means of
enforcement do little to provide society with a clear understanding

135

See supra note 131 (describing the legal penalties of insider trading).
See supra note 115 and accompanying text (discussing the difficulty of
detecting insider trading).
137
See HAZEN, supra note 5, at 640 (saying that insider trading is not
actually defined in legislation).
138
See infra Part II.B.3.a (showing the courts limitations on Rule 10b-5
liability).
139
Michael Seitzinger, Federal Securities Law: Insider Trading,
Congressional Research Service (Jan. 30, 2002), available at
http://pennyhill.com.
140
See discussion supra Part II.B.3.a-c.
141
An example of a trade on inside information that is legal would be a
person with no relationship to the corporation that fortuitously overhears a piece
of material nonpublic information and buys or sells securities based on that
information.
142
See supra Part II.B.1.a and accompanying text (describing the harms
associated with insider trading as being unfair to outside investors and causing
instability in the marketplace).
136

MALONE1.DOC

350

3/3/2004 1:50 PM

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

the crime of insider trading.143
The three major rules that are used to prosecute insider trading
are rule 10b-5,144 rule 16b,145 and rule 14e-3.146 Rule 10b-5, which
is most commonly used to prosecute insider trading is vague and
unevenly applied.147 Although section 16b and rule 14e-3 appear
clear, they are too narrow in scope to address the inadequacy of
rule 10b-5.148 An analysis of each of the rules reveals the difficulty
in defining what insider trading is and shows that the law is often
unable to adequately prevent the harm associated with insider
trading.
a. Rule 10b-5
Rule10b-5, promulgated under the authority of section 10(b)
Securities Exchange Act of 1934,149 does not even use the term
insider trading.150 Instead the language used to prosecute insider
143

See supra Part II.B.3 (noting that a crime must be a well defined risk to
deter a rational actor in their cost-benefit analysis).
144
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2003) (finding it unlawful to “engage in any act,
practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud . . . in
connection with the purchase or sale of any security”).
145
17 C.F.R. § 240.16b-5 (2003) (finding that it any short swing profit by
an insider “shall inure to and be recoverable by the issuer, irrespective of any
intention on the part of the beneficial owner, director or officer . . .”).
146
17 C.F.R. § 240.14(e)(3) (2003) (stating that to trade on inside
information with respect to a tender offer “shall constitute a fraudulent,
deceptive, or manipulative act . . .”).
147
See HAZEN, supra note 5, at 640 (stating that insider trading is not
defined in legislation and that the law has failed to develop systematically or
provide bright line rules).
148
See discussion infra Part II.B.3.b-c (discussing the inadequacy of
section 16b and rule14e-3).
149
Section 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 says in
relevant part that it shall be unlawful “to use or employ, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security registered on a national securities exchange or
any security not so registered . . . any manipulative or deceptive device or
contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission
may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the
protection of investors . . . .” 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2003).
150
Rule 10b-5 provides:
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trading is that it is illegal to knowingly “engage in any act,
practice, or course of behavior which operates or would operate as
a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase
or sale of any security.”151 Since rule10b-5 does not actually define
the crime of insider trading, the courts have interpreted the rule in
a way that is often confusing in application.152
The evolution of the duty element of 10b-5 liability illustrates
the inconsistent application of rule 10b-5 to prevent the harm
caused by insider trading. In In re Cady, Roberts & Co., the SEC
determined that rule 10b-5 mandated that corporate insiders have a
duty to either abstain from trading on material inside information
or disclose the inside information prior to trading.153 Since Cady,
Roberts, & Co., the Supreme Court has further interpreted the duty
element to scale back the broad reach of rule 10b-5. In Chiarella v.
United States, the Supreme Court exposed the inconsistent
application of insider trading laws when it overturned the SEC
conviction of a financial printer employee who traded on
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or
of any facility of any national securities exchange, (a) to employ any
device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, (b) [t]o make any untrue
statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary
in order to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances
under which they were made, not misleading, or (c) [t]o engage in any
act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as
a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or
sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2003).
151
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2003).
152
See HAZEN, supra note 5, at 640 (stating that “the law [with regard to
insider trading] has not developed systematically nor has it evolved in such a
way to produce bright-line tests of when it is permissible to trade”).
153
In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 1961 WL 69638, at *3 (S.E.C. Release No.
34-6668) (stating that corporate insiders owe a duty to disclose or abstain from
trading on inside information). See also United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642,
651-52 (1997) (discussing that under the classical theory of 10(b) liability the
duty derived from the relationship of trust and confidence between the insider of
a corporation and the shareholders of a corporation). This duty has since been
extended to include the source of the information that has been misappropriated.
Id. at 653 (adopting the misappropriation theory).
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confidential information regarding tender offers.154 The Supreme
Court held that the printer did not have a duty to disclose, prior to
the trade, the information he traded on under rule 10b-5 and
section 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934.155 This
was because the printer owed no duty to the corporation or its
shareholders.156
Again in 1983, the Supreme Court overturned a conviction for
insider trading using rule 10b-5 and section 10(b) when it found
there was no requisite breach of duty in United States v. Dirks.157
In Dirks, a broker, that was tipped by a corporate insider that the
corporation had been engaging in fraudulent behavior, selectively
disclosed that information to his clients, who were in turn able to
avoid significant loss.158 The Court found, however, that because
the corporate insider did not gain a personal benefit when he tipped
Mr. Dirks there was no requisite breach of duty.159 Although not
typical insiders, such as a director or officer, who owe a duty of
disclosure to a corporation,160 both Chiarella and Dirks knowingly
subjected the market to the potential adverse effects of insider
trading.161 Both men took advantage of access to nonpublic inside
information through their positions of employment.162 Both men
154

445 U.S. 222 (1980).
Id. at 232. A tender offer is “[a] public announcement by a company . . .
that it will pay a price above the current market price for shares ‘tendered’ of a
company it wishes to acquire control of.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1468 (6th
ed. 1990).
156
Id.
157
463 U.S. 646 (1983).
158
Id. at 648-49.
159
Id. at 665-66.
160
See Cady, Roberts & Co., 1961 WL 69638 at *3 (finding that corporate
insiders owe a duty to disclose or abstain from trading with inside information).
See also Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 227-28 (citing Cady and noting that although
insiders owe a duty to the corporation through their employment, Chiarella was
not under a duty to disclose his misuse of information).
161
Dirks, 463 U.S. 646; Chiarella, 445 U.S. 222. Chiarella directed traded
securities with inside knowledge regarding a tender offer while Dirks passed the
inside information onto his clients who then trade on the information. Chiarella,
445 U.S. at 222.
162
See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 651 (finding that Dirks passed the inside
155
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also had an unfair advantage over outside uninformed traders. Yet,
neither one was ultimately found guilty of insider trading.163
In response to the gray areas illustrated in the duty analysis of
Chiarella and Dirks, the Supreme Court adopted the
misappropriation theory in United States v. O’Hagan.164 O’Hagan
defined the misappropriation theory as holding that “a person
commits fraud ‘in connection with’ a securities transaction, and
thereby violates section 10(b) and rule 10b-5, when he
misappropriates confidential information for securities trading
purposes, in breach of a duty owed to the source of the
information.”165 The misappropriation theory broadened the duty
requirement under rule 10b-5 and imposed a fiduciary duty on
investors who trade with inside information to the source of the
information.166 The misappropriation theory reaches people who
under previous law would be exempt from liability because they
did not owe a fiduciary duty to the corporation and the
corporation’s shareholders.167
The SEC has since supplemented the misappropriation theory
with the promulgation of rule 10b5-2 which defines three
situations in which a person owes a duty of trust or confidence.168
information through his position as a broker); Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 222
(finding that Chiarella learned of the inside information through his position as a
printer).
163
See Dirks, 463 U.S. 646; Chiarella, 445 U.S. 222.
164
521 U.S. 642, 647 (1997) (finding that lawyer owed no duty to
corporation but owed duty to law firm who worked with corporation and
simultaneously holding that the SEC did not exceed rule making authority in
rule 14e-3 and adopting the misappropriation theory).
165
Id. at 652.
166
Id. (stating that information is misappropriated when there is a breach of
duty to the source of information).
167
See Lee, supra note 65, at 128 (noting that the property approach of the
misappropriation theory did not displace duty analysis, but rather extended the
reach of the securities laws).
168
Section 10(b)5-2 states in relevant part that a person owes a duty of trust
or confidence:
(1) Whenever a person agrees to maintain information in confidence;
(2) Whenever the person communicating the material nonpublic
information and the person to whom it is communicated have a history,
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The three situations focus on a duty to keep a confidence either
through a work relationship, past dealings or familial relations.169
The facts in O’Hagan, a case in which a partner at a law firm
traded on inside information regarding an upcoming tender offer
from one of the firm’s clients, clearly fit into one of these
categories.170 O’Hagan owed a duty of trust and confidence under
the misappropriation theory because of the confidence required
between a lawyer, the firm at which he is employed and the
client.171 The misappropriation theory does not, however, succeed
fully in clarifying the law of insider trading because there are many
situations when the duty imposed by the misappropriation theory is
either unclear or insufficient.172
Applying the misappropriation theory to the ImClone scandal,
it is unclear whether all the actors will be found to have a duty.173
pattern, or practice of sharing confidences, such that the recipient of the
information knows or reasonably should know that the person
communicating the material nonpublic information expects that the
recipient will maintain its confidentiality; or (3) Whenever a person
receives or obtains material nonpublic information from his spouse,
parent, child, or sibling; provided, however, that the person receiving or
obtaining the information may demonstrate that no duty of trust or
confidence existed with respect to the information, by establishing that
he or she neither knew nor reasonably should have known that the
person who was the source of the information expected that the person
would keep the information confidential, because of the parties’
history, pattern, or practice of sharing and maintaining confidences, and
because there was no agreement or understanding to maintain the
confidentiality of the information.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10(b)5-2 (2001).
169
Id. It is possible that an employment contract with Merrill Lynch may
include some confidentiality agreement. This agreement would make it easier to
claim that Bacanovic owed a duty to Merrill Lynch. Id.
170
O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 647-48.
171
Id. at 653.
172
An example of this would be a live-in partner that does not quite fit the
“familial category” or past dealings with counselor that does not impose the
same type of professional duty to keep a confidence to their clients as a
psychiatrist.
173
See supra note 40 and accompanying text (explaining the facts of the
ImClone scandal).
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Dr. Waksal, the CEO of Imclone, had a fiduciary duty to the
corporation and shareholders so it is unnecessary to further
evaluate his behavior under the misappropriation theory.174 Peter
Bacanovic,175 the Merrill Lynch broker, could be found to have
owed a duty to Merrill Lynch under “a shared history, pattern or
practice of sharing confidences”176 or even under his employment
contract.177 Martha Stewart, however, would be difficult to fit
within one of the categories unless it could be shown that her past
dealings with Waksal showed a pattern of shared confidences or
that she knew that Bacanovic was in breach of his duties when he
advised her to sell her shares.178 If Martha Stewart had a familial
174

Dr. Waksal would also have a duty under traditional 10b-5 analysis
because he was the CEO of ImClone and owed the corporation a fiduciary duty.
See supra note 153(noting the duty analysis introduced in In re Cady).
175
Peter Bacanovic may have a duty under traditional analysis without the
necessity of the misappropriation theory. See Dirks, 463 U.S. 646. It would be,
however, difficult to prove because under Dirks the court held that breach of
duty required a benefit to the trader. Id. (finding broker did not breach a duty
because he did not financially benefit when he tipped his customers). If
Bacanovic was only executing Martha Stewart’s order and not trading for his
own benefit, it would be a harder case. See supra note 159 and accompanying
text (discussing the Dirks duty analysis).
176
17 C.F.R. § 240.10(b)(5)-2(2) (2001).
177
17 C.F.R. § 240.10(b)(5)-2(1) (2001).
178
It is important to note that Martha Stewart could still be subject to 10b-5
under traditional analysis. She would be, however, subject to duty analysis under
Chiarella and Dirks, which would require a finding that Dr. Waksal was in
breach of his duty to ImClone that he benefited from this breach and that she
knew he was in breach of his duty. See supra notes 154-59 and accompanying
text (discussing the difficulties with duty analysis under Chiarella and Dirks).
Reflecting the difficulty in prosecuting insider trading cases Martha Stewart has
not been indicted for criminal insider trading charges. Colleen Debaise, Stewart
Seeks Dismissal of Charges, WALL ST. J., Oct. 7, 2003, at C12 (citing that
although the government investigated Martha Stewart’s trading activity, the
indictment did not reflect an insider trading indictment). It is necessary to note
that the SEC has filed civil insider trading charges. Id. This indictment,
however, has been criticized. See Warren L. Dennis and Bruce Boyden, Stewart
Prosecution Imperils Business Civil Liberties, LEGAL BACKGROUNDER, Oct. 2,
2003, available at http://www. marthatalks.com (referring to the indictment as
“an unprecedented and unanticipated expansion of insider trading theory, one
that gives every indication of having been crafted to snare Stewart rather than
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relation to Waksal or Bacanovic, she would be easier to
prosecute.179 This is an arbitrary distinction. The proposed harm of
insider trading, disruption of market confidence and unfair trade
practices180 is not lessened because the person trading on inside
information is unrelated to the source. Therefore, as illustrated by
this one example, the misappropriation theory is also underinclusive in application.
b. Section 16(b)
Section 16(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act prohibits
corporate insiders from profiting on short swing trades.181 It only
applies to a limited class of people, however, and only prohibits
active trades.182 The rule considers all trades to be illegal within a
period of less than six months to be insider trading unless there is a
previously written schedule of trades.183 Section 16(b) does not
have a scienter requirement like rule 10b-5 because it states that
the profit shall inure and be recoverable “irrespective of any
intention on the party of such beneficial owner, director, or

close an important interstice in the law”).
179
17 C.F.R. § 240.10(b)(5)-2(3) (2001) (listing familial relationship as one
that will be presumed to encompass a duty of confidence).
180
See supra Part II.B.a (discussing the harms associated with insider
trading).
181
15 U.S.C. § 16 78p(b) (2002). Section 16(b) provides that:
For the purposes of preventing unfair use of information which may
have been obtained by such beneficial owner, director, or officer by
reason of his relationship to the issuer, any profit realized by him from
any purchase or sale, or any sale and purchase, of any equity security of
issuer (other than an exempted security) or a security-based swap
agreement . . . involving any such equity security within any period of
less than six months . . . shall inure to and be recoverable by the issuer,
irrespective of any intention on the part of such beneficial owner,
director, or officer . . . .
Id.
182
Id. (applying to the “beneficial owner, director, or officer” and to the
“purchase and sale” or sale and purchase” of securities).
183
Id.
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officer.”184 It is too narrow in scope, however, to close the gaps in
enforcement left open by rule 10b-5.185 The application of section
16(b) is inconsistent when compared to the harms it is designed to
prevent because of its requirement that the insider must actively
trade to commit the offense.186 Therefore, the insider, who has a
permissible schedule of trades, may decide to hold his shares based
on material nonpublic information. Likewise the insider could tip
his friends and family to hold their shares in advance of an
upcoming event that will increase the price of the shares.187 The
insider, therefore, has an unfair advantage over the outside
uninformed investor and knowingly uses inside information to
dictate market activity. Nonetheless, he would not violate section
16(b) because he did not actively trade on his inside
information.188
c. Rule 14e-3
The enactment of rule 14e-3189 under the statutory authority to

184

15 U.S.C. § 16 78p(b). Scienter is required because rule 10b-5 invokes
the common law doctrine of fraud rather than actually define expressly address
insider trading. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2002). The relevant portion states that it
is illegal “to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security.” Id. (emphasis added).
185
See supra note 150 (applying to active purchase or sale of a security and
limiting violation to a distinct group of people).
186
Id. The language of the statute specifies “a purchase or sale of a security
of an issuer.” 15 U.S.C. § 16 78p(b).
187
Rather than incidentally profiting with the rise of the shares or selling
early and missing out on the rise of the shares like outside investors, the insiders
and their respective tippees could have an advance notice of the event and hold
their shares accordingly. An example of this would be a corporate director that
regularly sells 1000 shares every year and decided not to sell until the resulting
increase in share value after receiving inside information of a profitable business
venture.
188
15 U.S.C. § 16 78p(b) (2002).
189
Rule 14e-3 provides that transactions in securities on the basis of
material, nonpublic information in the context of tender offers satisfy the
requirements of the offense of insider trading:
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regulate tender offers190 in the 1980s attempted to close the gap
between what was legal versus illegal insider trading.191 Rule 14e3 eliminates the need for a breach of fiduciary duty when trading
(a) [i]f any person has taken a substantial step or steps to commence, or
has commenced a tender offer (the ‘offering person’), it shall constitute
a fraudulent, deceptive or manipulative act or practice within the
meaning of section 14(e) of the Act for any other person who is in
possession of material information relating to such tender offer which
information he knows or has reason to know is nonpublic and which he
knows or has reason to know has been acquired directly or indirectly
from: (1) The offering person (2) The issuer of the securities sought or
to be sought by such tender offer, or (3) Any officer, director, partner
or employee or any other person acting on behalf of the offering person
or such issuer, to purchase or sell or cause to be purchased or sold any
of such securities or any securities convertible into exchangeable for
any such securities or any option or right to obtain or to dispose of any
of the foregoing securities, unless within a reasonable time prior to any
purchase or sale of such information and its source are publicly
disclosed by press release or otherwise.
17 C.F.R. § 240.14(e)(3) (2002).
190
Section 14(e) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 gives the SEC
the authority by providing:
It shall be unlawful for any person to make any untrue statement of a
material fact or omit to state any material fact necessary in order to
make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under
which they are made, not misleading, or to engage in any fraudulent,
deceptive, or manipulative acts or practices, in connection with any
tender offer or request or invitation for tenders, or any solicitation of
security holders in opposition to or in favor of any such offer, request
or invitation. The Commission shall, for the purpose of this subsection,
by rules and regulations define, and prescribe means reasonably
designed to prevent, such acts and practices as are fraudulent,
deceptive, or manipulative.
15 U.S.C. § 78(n)(e). In O’Hagan, the Supreme Court ruled that the SEC did not
exceed this authority in the promulgation of rule 14e-3. United States v.
O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 674 (1997).
191
O’Hagan did this by extending the duty analysis to include an
employee’s duty to their employer. This expansion of duty dealt with the
previous problem exposed in Chiarella v. United States in which a printer
employee who traded on inside information was held not to have a duty to
stockholders under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 445
U.S. 222 (1980).
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material nonpublic information relating to a tender offer.192 Rule
14e-3 makes it “fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative act or
practice” to engage in the trade of material, nonpublic information
in relation to a tender offer without proof of any fiduciary duty.193
Although this rule appears to capture most situations involved in
trading on material nonpublic information during a tender offer, it
fails to explain why information regarding tender offers is worthy
of more legal attention than other types of corporate inside
information that could have a volatile effect on the stock market.194
Although probably a reaction to the prevalence of takeovers
and tender offers in the 1980s,195 the discrepancy between the
specificity of Rule 14e-3 and a catch-all rule such as 10b-5 is
troubling.196 Using the example of the ImClone scandal, a tippee
such as Martha Stewart who allegedly received material nonpublic
information through someone she knew to be a corporate officer
will be more difficult to prosecute because the information was in
relation to the FDA examination of Erbitux rather than a tender
offer.197 If the information Martha Stewart had allegedly traded on
were in relation to a tender offer, she would clearly fall under the
purview of the rule. But because it was not in relation to a tender
offer and therefore must be analyzed under traditional 10b-5
liability, it is necessary to prove a duty.198 This distinction is
192

17 C.F.R. § 240.14(e)(3) (2002).
Id.
194
For example, news that a corporation is going to be facing expensive
litigation, or that an overstatement of assets is about to be exposed could also
have a dramatic effect on a stock’s market value.
195
See HAZEN, supra note 5, at 480 (stating that a new type of financing
that first became available in the 1980’s became a very common method for
takeovers).
196
Rule 10(b)(5)(c) merely provides in relevant part “to engage in any act,
practice, or course of business, which operates or would operate as a fraud or
deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.”
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2002). See supra note 150.
197
17 C.F.R. § 240.14(e)(3) (2002) (extending duty only in relation to a
tender offer).
198
See supra Part II.B.3.a (discussing the duty requirement under 10b-5).
See also Jerry Markon, Martha Stewart Could be Charged as ‘Tippee,’ WALL
ST. J., Oct. 3, 2002, at C1 (stating that “[t]ypically, insider-trading cases are
193
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illogical because, for example, in the particular situation involving
ImClone, the effect of the success or failure of the cancer drug
Erbitux on the stock price of ImClone is comparable to the effect
of information regarding a tender offer.199
Rule 14e-3 also fails to resolve the discrepancy between a
person who uses the inside information with knowledge of the
source and a person who comes across the information
fortuitously.200 This is because rule 14 e-3 states that the trade:
shall constitute a fraudulent, deceptive or manipulative act
or practice within the meaning of section 14(e) of the Act
for any person who is in possession of material information
relating to such tender offer which information he knows or
has reason to know is nonpublic and which he knows or has
reason to know has been acquired directly or indirectly
from: (1) The offering person, (2) The issuer of the
securities sought or to be sought by such tender offer, or (3)
Any officer, director, partner or employer or any other
person acting on behalf of the offering person.201
This distinction may have roots in the principle that a person must
have a sufficient mens rea to commit a crime, but it does little to
justify the fact that both situations will have an identical effect on
the market. Therefore, although Rule 14e-3 is both highly specific
as to what constitutes an offense in relation to tender offers and
encompasses traders with and without a traditional duty, it is still
under inclusive and inadequate in relation to the enforcement of a
ban on insider trading as a whole.202 Rule 14e-3 fails to fully
brought against individuals who had knowledge and traded on market-moving
information—about an impending merger or a decline in earnings, for
example—before it is publicly announced. Thus, any insider-trading case
against Ms. Stewart could be more difficult to win than a traditional case”).
199
See Anand, supra note 21 (noting the huge impact Erbitux had on the
value of ImClone).
200
An example of a person who receives the information without
knowledge would be someone who overhears a conversation or receives the
information from an acquaintance without realizing that it is nonpublic.
201
17 C.F.R. § 240.14(e)(3) (2002).
202
See id. (applying only in relation to a tender offer when someone
violates the provision with intent).
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address the harms caused by insider trading because it punishes
some people who trade on inside information, potentially harm
small investors and create instability in the market, but benefits
those that create the same effect yet do not fit into the necessary
categories.203
The result of the ambiguity of what constitutes illegal insider
trading and the laws inability to adequately address the harms
lower the effectiveness of a legal cost for the behavior. Rather than
resolving the ambiguity a potential inside trader may face as to the
wrongfulness of the action, the law exacerbates the problem. Like
a child that is inconsistently disciplined without logical
explanation, the potential trader is not deterred from engaging in
the behavior.
C. Justification of Trading on Inside Information
Even if a potential trader of inside information perceives the
potential normative and legal costs of insider trading, that trader
can justify the behavior. Justification can ameliorate the guilt that a
generally law-abiding citizen feels when breaking the law.204
Rather than giving up the potential benefits of the crime, they can
still “derive . . . personal benefit by going through with the act . . .
strip[ping] it of its negative connotation by casting it into a
positive, or at least acceptable, light.”205 Sociologists Sykes and
Matza identified five common types of justification: denial of
injury, denial of victim, denial of responsibility, appeal to higher
loyalties and condemning the condemner.206 Most relevant to a
discussion of insider trading are the denials of injury, victims, and
responsibility. Thus, even though a person is aware that trading
with inside information is against the law and that society views
people that commit the crime as greedy and cheating, they may
203

Id.
See supra Part II.B (discussing the internal costs associated with
breaking the law).
205
GABOR, supra note 98, at 186.
206
SZOCKYJ, supra note 11, at 104 (discussing Sykes and Matza’s theory of
neutralization which explains the techniques that offenders employ to retain
their positive self-image while breaking the law).
204
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deny that they are actually doing anything wrong.207
Justification of law-breaking behavior is very common,
especially among people who view themselves as law abiding.208
People often commit small acts of theft without categorizing them
as stealing or may cheat on their taxes because they feel that the
government does not have a rightful claim on their earnings.209
People may rationalize insider trading by viewing it as a
“victimless” crime because they are not harming a specific person
but a corporation or the market in general.210 The victim of insider
trading, presumably the market and the uninformed shareholder, is
amorphous and difficult to conceptualize.211 If the victim is
acknowledged, then the victim, like the government in the tax
scenario, may not be sufficiently sympathetic.212
It is also relatively easy to deny that the trader is committing
any actual harm. Not only is the offense poorly defined, leaving
the perpetrator to question whether his conduct falls under the
confines of the law, but many scholars argue that the insider
trading helps rather than hurts the market.213 A person, therefore,
could reasonably justify an act of insider trading as not hurting
anyone or not being a crime at all. Someone who could be liable
under the misappropriation theory may have merely passed on the
information rather than committed the trade.214 That person may
207

See supra Part II.B (discussing the costs associated with insider trading).
GABOR, supra note 98, at 186.
209
Id. at 73-74 (describing common theft situations such as stealing a
grocery cart from the supermarket, towels from a hotel, and menus from a
restaurant).
210
See SZOCKYJ, supra note 11, at 104 (discussing denial of victim as a
powerful justification).
211
See Hang, supra note 67(describing the victim as the uninformed
shareholder).
212
Id. at 189 (discussing a robber who claimed he only robbed people who
could afford it). But see supra notes 66-71 and accompanying text (discussing
the argument that insider trading is fundamentally unfair and highlighting the
injury to outside uninformed investors).
213
See MACEY, supra note 66, at 25-28 (discussing the relationship
between insider trading and the shareholder’s welfare).
214
United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 652 (1997) (holding that a
person may be liable for insider trading under the misappropriation theory when
208
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justify their actions by denying responsibility of insider trading
because the actual trade rather than the mere transfer of
information causes the harm.
The power of justifications is enormous. Every time a person
fails to come to a complete stop at a stop sign when driving in the
middle of the night because “they aren’t going to hurt anyone” or
refills a drink at a restaurant without paying because “the
restaurant charges too much for soda anyway,” the person is
employing justifications to rationalize breaking the law. Therefore,
the ability to justify insider trading lowers the incentive to comply
with the law.215
III. A POTENTIAL SOLUTION
The decision to commit the crime of insider trading is a
rational one because the costs a person risks when trading illegally
on material nonpublic information are outweighed by potential
benefits and available justifications. It is likely that successful
people, such as Martha Stewart, will continue to risk losing wealth
and social status and face the possibility of jail time in order to
potentially protect assets and increase wealth and social status.216

“a person commits fraud in ‘connection with a securities transaction’, and
thereby violates §10(b) and Rule10b-5, when he misappropriates confidential
information for securities trading purposes, in breach of a duty owed to the
source of the information”). This means that a person who passes inside
information to another person, without personal benefit, in breach of a duty to
the source and the latter person trades on that information, the former could be
held liable under the misappropriation theory. See HAZEN, supra note 5, at 580
(explaining the ruling in O’Hagan). If the tippee is found to owe a duty to the
source of the information, such as a duty to their employer or spouse, then the
misappropriation theory will apply. Id. at 655 (discussing how a tippee could
have a duty under the misappropriation theory). However, if the tippee does not
owe a duty of confidence to the source of the information than Dirks and
Chiarella duty analysis will apply. Id. at 653 (giving examples where the
misappropriation theory will not apply).
215
See GABOR, supra note 98, at 186 (discussing the power of
justification).
216
See supra Part II (concluding that the costs associated with insider
trading do not outweigh the benefits).
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In order to more effectively deter this type of decision, the law
must be strengthened to override the normative structure of
society.
The law can override the high informal benefits and low
informal costs.217 If insider trading is a behavior that the country
wants to prevent, then it must be viewed as wrongful. That view
must be supported through consistent legal deterrence. If, in fact,
insider trading has a negative effect on the markets and is actually
217

There are other potential solutions. For example an adjustment of the
informal costs and benefits associated with insider trading would influence the
level of normative deterrence felt by those that illegally trade on inside
information. This would be difficult, however because many of the norms that
reinforce insider trading also coincide with the countries economic structure. See
supra Part II.B.1.b (discussing the way the norms in a capitalist society such as
the United States may fail to adequately deter insider trading). Another potential
solution is to conform the law to the ambivalent societal norms and legalize
insider trading. It is argued that insider trading could be controlled through a
deregulated scheme by the owners of information themselves, namely the
corporations. MACEY, supra note 66, at 28. In this scenario, corporations could
decide whether to allow insiders to trade on their information in lieu of other
benefits such as compensation and regulate those that breached a company wide
ban by monitoring and threat of potential loss of employment. Id. Although this
solution is plausible, this possibility is also unlikely because insider trading has
been consistently regulated since the 1930’s following the Depression. NASSER
ARSHADI & THOMAS H. EYSSELL, THE LAW AND FINANCE OF CORPORATE
INSIDER TRADING THEORY AND EVIDENCE 19 (1993) (discussing the history of
insider trading regulation). The legalization of insider trading is also unlikely
because, although not as strictly policed, much of the international community
has stepped up their insider trading regulations to keep pace with the United
States. See Calabra, supra note 106, at 469 (saying that Germany made insider
trading illegal in 1994 to remain competitive in the international market); see
also Nasser, supra note 106, at 377 (stating that although insider trading is
illegal in Canada and Japan it is not punished as severely and that Japan did not
consider insider trading punishable by imprisonment until 1997). There has also
been a European Community Directive issued which proscribes a minimum
uniform standard of legislation for all members to regulate insider trading.
Thomas Lee Hazen, Defining Illegal Trading—Lessons from the European
Community Directive on Insider Trading, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 231, 236
(1992) (discussing the implementation in 1989 of the European Community
Directive that defines insider trading based on trading while in possession of
information). Therefore, in today’s fluid global market it would be difficult for
the United States to deregulate insider trading at this time.
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fundamentally unfair, then all insider trading should be deemed
wrongful.218 Like other legally wrongful behavior, unintentional
trading need not be punished.219 A clear definition of the offense
and consistent application is necessary for sufficient deterrence. If
the law is to effectively deter insider trading, the law must work to
strengthen weak normative costs associated with insider trading
and raise a barrier against effective use of justifications.
This cannot be accomplished by a mere increase in
sanctions.220 A clear definition is necessary to allow the costs of
insider trading to outweigh the benefits. It must be clear to a
potential perpetrator that they will actually be committing illegal
insider trading. Although not perfect, the directive issued by the
European Community is a good example.221 Rather than regulating
insider trading under a catchall fraud statute such as 10(b), the
directive clearly defines insider trading without a duty
requirement.222 The directive prohibits trading with the possession
218

See Hang, supra note 67 (discussing the fairness argument of insider
trading).
219
See KADISH, supra note 130, at 203 (discussing the concern of a
perpetrator’s mental state when punishing criminal behavior). For example, if
the mens rea requirement was abandoned, then an outside investor could trade
on inside information he reasonably believed to be public and inadvertently
commit a crime.
220
See supra note 131 and accompanying text (noting the increase in legal
sanctions in 1984 and 1988; a failed response to insider trading scandals of the
1980’s).
221
See Hazen, supra note 221 (noting the implementation of the European
Community Directive on Insider Trading).
222
The Council Directive 89/592 Coordinating Regulations on Insider
Dealing, defines the both inside information and the people who will be held
liable for trading with it:
‘inside information’ shall mean information which has not been made
public of a precise nature relating to one or several issuers of
transferable securities or to one or several transferable securities,
which, if it were made public, would be likely to have a significant
effect on the price of the transferable security or securities in question.
2. ‘transferable securities’ shall mean:(a) shares and debt securities, as
well as securities equivalent to shares and debt securities; (b) contracts
or rights to subscribe for, acquire or dispose of securities referred to in
(a); (c) futures contracts, options and financial futures in respect of
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of material nonpublic knowledge.223 The duty requirement in
current American legislation is especially problematic as illustrated
by Chiarella and Dirks and has not been completely solved by the
misappropriation theory.224 The directive does not resolve all
ambiguities regarding insider trading, but is a good example of
legislation that offers a clear definition of insider trading.225
Not only does the offense have to be clearly defined, but it also
has to be perceived as wrong. The law must compensate for the
weak societal deterrence of insider trading. A potential way to
increase the perception of wrongfulness would be to transfer the
legislation used to prosecute insider trading from the SEC’s
securities referred to in (a); (d) index contracts in respect of securities
referred to in (a), when admitted to trading on a market which is
regulated and supervised by authorities recognized by public bodies,
operates regularly and is accessible directly or indirectly to the public.
Article 2. 1. Each Member State shall prohibit any person who: by
virtue of his membership of the administrative, management or
supervisory bodies of the issuer, by virtue of his holding in the capital
of the issuer, or because he has access to such information by virtue of
the exercise of his employment, profession or duties, possesses inside
information from taking advantage of that information with full
knowledge of the facts by acquiring or disposing of for his own account
or for the account of a third party, either directly or indirectly,
transferable securities of the issuer or issuers to which that information
relates. 2. Where the person referred to in paragraph 1 is a company or
other type of legal person, the prohibition laid down in that paragraph
shall apply to the natural persons who take part in the decision to carry
out the transaction for the account of the legal person concerned. 3. The
prohibition laid down in paragraph 1 shall apply to any acquisition or
disposal of transferable securities effected through a professional
intermediary.
1989, O.J. (L334) 30.
223
Id.
224
United States v. Dirks, 463 U.S. 646 (1983) (finding that a broker did
not breach a duty because he did not gain a financial benefit when tipping his
customers inside information); Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980)
(finding that a printer did not owe shareholders a duty when he traded on inside
information). See supra Part II.B.3.a (discussing the difficulty of applying the
misappropriation theory and finding it is unclear who it will reach).
225
See supra note 150 and accompanying text. For example, a person must
still actively trade with inside information. Id.
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administrative regulations, incorporating insider trading into
federal criminal law.226 It is necessary to clearly provide what state
of mind is required as well as what specific acts are required to
commit the offense. A lower mens rea, such as negligence, would
widen the scope of insider trading laws.227 The law should also
address all illegal use of insider information rather than just
punishing those that actually purchase or sell securities.228 An
insider that holds while using inside information is gaining the
same unfair advantage against the uninformed investor as the
insider that actively trades.229 The law needs to adequately address
the harm it seeks to prevent.230 It must be exceptionally clear and
consistent because the prohibition of insider trading it does not
necessarily coincide with the norms in this country.231 Although
strengthening insider trading legislation is the most likely solution,
the decision to trade on inside information, in American culture, is
one that must be made more difficult if criminalization of insider
trading is to be made effective.

226

It is necessary that regulation of insider trading remain on the federal
level rather than the state level because of the fluidity of the market across state
lines. Although criminal law is generally the responsibility of the states, in this
case the federal government has authority to regulate insider trading under the
commerce clause. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; see also William Brian
Gaddy, A Review of Constitutional Principals to Limit the Reach of Federal
Criminal Statutes, 67 UMKC L. REV. 209, 210 (1999).
227
For example a mens rea requirement of negligence would address the
trader that overhears inside information and trades on it without determining
whether the information is public or not. Negligence is defined as “the omission
to do something which a reasonable man, guided by those ordinary
considerations which ordinarily regulate human affairs, would do, or the doing
of something which a reasonable and prudent man would not do” BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 1032 (6th ed. 1990).
228
See supra note 187 and accompanying text (discussing the benefits and
insider could achieve by holding his shares based on inside information).
229
Id.
230
The harm most commonly associated with insider trading is that it is
unfair to uninformed investors and causes instability in the marketplace. See
discussion supra Part II.B.1.a.
231
See supra Part II.B.1.b (finding that normative costs do not adequately
deter insider trading).
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CONCLUSION
A person faced with the rational choice of whether or not to
trade on inside information will confront many potential costs and
benefits. Many potential perpetrators will find that the benefits
outweigh the costs. In addition, they can justify this criminal
behavior. With the current state of the law, it is not surprising that
a person with significant wealth and/or social status, such as
Martha Stewart, would risk the penalties of insider trading at the
possibility of achieving the benefits. In order to curb the problem
insider trading the potential costs must be clearly perceived and
increased. Therefore, the crime of insider trading should be more
clearly defined in legislation and more consistently applied in
order to compensate for weak informal costs.

